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WILLIAIVI B.

as District Attorney of the
v. JOSEPH 1\L LOWERY, as Auditor o£ the County of Los
Re-

[1] Public Officers-Compensation-Increasing Compensation.-In
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which he was
tion, is no
53071.
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§
his term of
and a county
of any elective county
or
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apply to an oftleer who is
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tenn of
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a salary increase for an
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adopted a su!!lcient time prior to the election to
with
any local
[3] St2~tutcs-Construction-Legislative Intent.--It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the statute be
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2, 4-6] Public Officers, § 110(1); [3]
Statutes, § 114.
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[ 4] Public Officers- Compensation- Increasing Compensation.One
purpose of: the
increases
an
is to prevent orfiee holders f:rom
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PROCEEDING in mandamus to
a county auditor to
pay a
increase for a district attorney elected to fill the
unexpired term of his
·writ
District
William B.
in pro per., for Petitioner.
Harold \V. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los
, William E.
Assistant County Counsel, and Donald K.
Byrne, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
CAR'fER, J.-The question presented by this
for a
\Yrit of mandate is whether petitioner is entitled to payment of
the salary increase which became effective after his
ment to the office of district
of I~os
County
but prior to his
election to that office for the unexpired term of his
The factual situation
by the petition is as follows:
On June 5, 1956, S. Ernest Roll was elected District Attorney of Los
for a
term whieh was
in December of 1956. 2\fr.
to commence on the first
Roll died on October
1956. On December 4, 1956, whieh
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was after Mr. Roll's term was to commence, \Villiam B. Meherein, vms appointed to the office of district
attornry. He ;,yas to hold office until tho election and qualification of his successor. (Los
County Charter, § 16.)
At the next general election, which was in June, 1958, petitioner was elected for a two-year term, the balance of Mr.
Roll's
term.
for district attorney at the time of petitioner's
was $23,000 per
1957, an
ordinance was
increasing the
to $25,000 per
year. After his election petitioner requested Joseph .M:.
I,owery, the auditor of lJOS Angeles County, to enter the salary
change on the county records and to pay him accordingly.
The request was
and now petitioner seeks a writ of
mandate to compel the county auditor to pay his salary at the
increased rate.
Article XI, section 5, of the California Constitution provides that "the compensation of any county, township or municipal officer shall not be increased after his election or during
his term of office .... " Section 52 of the Los Angeles County
Charter provides that ''the compensation of any elective
county or township officer shall not be increased or diminished
during the term for which he was elected, nor within ninety
days preceding his election.''
[1] Petitioner contends that, since the President of the
United States has not proclaimed the termination of hostilities
in the Korean \Var, the operation of the above provisions is
still
pursuant to sections 53070 and 53071 of the
Government Code, and he is entitled to the increased salary
from the effective date of the ordinance authorizing it, October 18, 1957. Section 53071 suspended the operation of provisions prohibiting the increase of compensation of elective
officers during time of war as defined by section 53070. This
eontention has recently been answered adversely in Rapp v.
Uil!SOII,
p. 4()7 [334 P.2d 575].
[2a] Petitioner next contends that the constitutional and
nharter provisions, although precluding his receiving the inereased salary during his appointive term, do not so preclude
);jm during his elective term. These provisions, petitioner
claims, apply to an officer who is appointed to fill an unexpired
tern1 of office, but not to one who is elected to fill the term.
It is our opinion that this contention is correct.
[3] It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that
the statute be scrutinized in the light of the legislative intent.
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It is dear 1hat

Olh'

] ner~;~~l(-)(-'S jn

t•onlp(·n~a"! io11

th:!ir iuiiuenc;e and
a:~t,;r they hav(' been ekdet1.
P.
.) ~Where; the
ha,; been
of the
the election of the one \rho is to fill tl1e unexter1n
tem1, this danger is not
\Yhether a eam1idate
i:.; elected is a matter
to ihe public "I,Yill. Th;: c:am1idate
o[ ('Oursc', cannot be certain of the ontconw of the
and it ~would indeed be an optimistic eandidate who
to proL:nrc a
increase for the position to which
election.
Tho fads of the
case demonstrate the absence
danger against which the prohibitions are directed.
'fhe salary ordinance 1vas enacted some nine months prior to
the time of the election. \Vhile at that time the petitioner
may have decided to beeome a candidate, he could not know
what opposition he y;ould have or what the election results
v·;ould be. 'fo attempt to srenre a salary inerea~e at t;wt time
>nmld be the result of mere ~ll'ishful thinking.
[2b] There is no need to give the provisions here involved
any interpretation broader than that necessary to aecomplish
their ol!vious purpose. \V e hold, therefore, that article XI,
section 5, of the Ccdifontia Constitution, and section 52 of the
Los Angeles County Charter do not J)rohibit a salary increase
for an offlcer elected to fill an unexpired term, where the
increase is adopted a sufficient time prior to the eleetion to
comply with any loeal provisions. Petitioner is therefore entitlf'd to the incrrased salary from and after ,Tu1y 1, 1958.
has cited Larew v.
81 Cal.
(590
P. 227]; Rtorkc v. Gmrx, 129 Cal. 526 [62 P. 68]; Harrison
v. Colgan, 148 Cal. 69
P. 674]; :wd Robbins v.
43 Cal.App.2cl 463 [111 P.2d 5], as eontt'olling authority in
this cm:e. 'rhose cases are distinguishable in that they involved
persons appointed, not elected, to an unexpired trrm. [6] An
appointee stands in the same shoes as his prec1reessor. Moreover, although the danger of undue influence on the salaryauthorizing body is not as great with an appointee as it is
with an incumbent officer, the danger is nonetheless sufficient
enough to warrant imposition of the eonstitutional and charter
prohibitions.
Let the writ issue directing respondent to pay to petitioner
the increased salary for the offieo of district attorney of IJOS

and

con-

there eannot
the statutory term ''
persons may
hold for successive parts of the term,
so that one who is elected or appointed after a part of such
term has
cannot have an increase made after the term
prior to his election or appointment." (II arrisnpra, 148 Cal. at 75.)
these cases the ''term of office'' herein is that to
1
-vvhich Mr. Roll was
and the salary ordinance, enacted
after that term
cannot take effect until the commencement of the next term of office in 1960. The majority
opinion nevertheless holds that the ordinance became effective on
1,
the date that petitioner commenced servthe part of the
term for which he was elected.
It does not overrule the
eases, but seeks to distinthem on the ground that they apply only to persons
and not to those elected for an unexpired term.
this distinction as meretricious. The express application of section 5 of article XI of the Constitution to "any"
connty officer precludes any implication that only appointed
officers are included in its prohibition or that the phrase "his
term of office" has one meaning for elected officers and a quite
different
for
officers or varies in meaning
to whether the officer is elected or appointed for the
fuH regular term of the office or for an unexpired part thereof.
The section no more
the exclusion from its operation
'Section 13 of the Los
County Charter provides that the term
of office for district attorney 'shall be four years, beginning at noon of
the first Monday in December following the election, and ending at noon
on the first Monday in December four years thereafter."
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